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This paper employs a lifecycle model from the consumption-savings literature to examine 
the tradeoffs between defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans.   We 
examine the effects of varying risk aversion, varying initial income and financial wealth, 
and varying wage processes (that may be correlated with returns on the risky asset).  
 
Results indicate that wage-indexed claims are not an optimal vehicle for retirement policy 
if the decision to participate is made early in life, because individuals hold most of their 
wealth in their human capital and would not wish to increase their exposure to income 
shocks.  Later in life, after most of a worker’s human capital has been converted to 
financial assets, defined benefit pension plans help increase diversification by reducing 
exposure to financial market risk.  The access that defined benefit plans provide to 
annuities markets and possible guaranteed rates of return over the risk-free rate increase 
the value of defined benefit plans to workers.  The model also predicts that wage-indexed 
claims will be more valuable when equity markets provide low expected returns or are 
highly variable and when annuity markets are inefficient.   
  
The model illustrates two economic functions performed by defined benefit plans.  
Firstly, DB plans pool individual wage risks.  This allows older workers to buy a wage-
linked security that increases their exposure to wage risks.  Secondly, they create a group 
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Most financially active people (and their dependants) face risk from two sources: wage 
instability and asset return variability.  The relative importance of these two sources of 
risk, and individuals’ responses to them, is an issue that has occupied a great deal of the 
economics literature.  The fact that this issue is significant in the context of retirement 
planning is reflected in the design of retirement plans themselves, of which two major 
types exist:  defined benefit (DB) plans, and defined contribution (DC) plans.  
 
A DB plan pays an individual a benefit defined by some formula, usually without 
reference either to the amount of contributions the worker has made to the plan or to the 
level of investment returns that the pension plan has earned on its assets.   A typical DB 
plan pays benefits linked to a worker’s final salary and the length of his service with the 
employer sponsoring the plan.  This linkage makes wage variability an important aspect 
to consider when examining the desirability of DB plans.   
 
DC plans, one the other hand, usually have fixed contributions but variable benefits.  The 
benefits depend on the level of contributions made by the employee and the investment 
return earned by the assets over the employee’s lifetime.   Investment risk is thus crucial 
in trying to understand the role played by DC plans in retirement portfolios.   
 
Both DB and DC plans are common in the United States and elsewhere.  Prominent 
examples of DB plans include the US Social Security system and final salary 
occupational pension plans, which are often provided to employees of larger US 
corporations and federal, state and local governments.  
   
A common type of DC plan in the US is the 401(k) plan, where contributions are paid 
into an individual member’s account, often by both the employer and the employee, 
returns accrue over the employee’s working life and the employee can access the 
accumulated balance from retirement.  Both DB and DC plans usually have vesting  2    
provisions whereby some benefits (usually only those relating to the employer portion of 
the contributions) are only available to the worker after a certain number of years of 
service have been completed. 
 
The balance of pension provision between DC and DB plans has changed dramatically 
internationally in the last two decades.  As recently as 1985, Ippolito (1985) was able to 
report that ‘most pension-covered workers in the United States are covered solely or 
primarily by defined benefit plans’.  By contrast, the US Department of Labor (2001) 
reported that of the 59% of employees covered by pension plans in 1996-1998, only 59% 
were members of defined benefit, or DB, plans.  Many of these individuals were also 
members of DC plans.  Large differences in pension plan provision have also emerged 
between public and private sector workers – only 32% of full-time private sector workers 
were covered by DB plans, while 90% of full-time public-sector workers were members 
of DB plans.   
 
Although the balance between DB and DC pension coverage has shifted, the number of 
workers that are members of both DB and DC plans, as well as the stability of DB 
pension coverage in some sectors of the economy, suggest that both types of plan play an 
important role in providing retirement security to workers. 
 
Until the late 1980’s, the traditional view was that DB plans protected workers from 
investment risk, as investment risk was borne by plan sponsors, and from income risk, as 
DB pension payments are explicitly linked to the final level of wages in most DB plans.
1  
However, an analysis by Bodie et al. (1988) revealed that the dependence of the 
retirement benefit stream on final wages actually increased an individual’s exposure to 
wage risks.  This was shown by their conclusion that if wage risks dominated investment 
risks, risk-averse individuals would prefer DC pension plans over DB plans under certain 
conditions.  However, they included income risk in retirement by recognizing that 
members of DC plans only have the option to annuitize their wealth at random interest 
                                                 
1 Some DB plans pay benefits fixed in nominal terms for each year of service.  These plans (which are 
almost all union plans) have an implicit link to wages because the benefits are increased in each round of 
union negotiations.  See Ippolito (1985) for a discussion of union plans.   3    
rates and were unable to reach a conclusion about which plan type a risk-averse 
individual would prefer.   
 
This paper extends the analysis of Bodie et al. (1988) in order to explore the conditions 
under which risk-averse individuals might prefer one type of pension plan over another.  
In an environment where many individuals have a mix of pension types, it is also useful 
to understand the determinants of the optimal mix between DB and DC pensions.  To 
achieve these goals, this paper applies a lifetime savings-consumption model to the 
DB/DC pension problem.  Wages are assumed to be risky and unhedgeable, and 
individuals are given the option of joining a DB pension plan (and to choose its 
generosity).  Individuals can choose their consumption and asset allocation (between 
risky and risk-free assets) at each point in their life-cycles.  Unlike the earlier Bodie 
analysis, this model makes wage and investment processes explicit (and possibly 
correlated), allows wage uncertainty and investment uncertainty to accumulate over time, 
models mortality both before and after retirement, and allows investment choice to 
change dynamically and endogenously.   This model flexibility is achieved at the expense 
of analytical tractability, and forces reliance on numerical solutions.  The approach of 
Carroll (1992,1997a,1997b)  for numerically solving stochastic dynamic programming 
problems is used.   Interest rates are assumed to be fixed. 
 
A final difference between this paper and earlier research is how we model the DB plan.   
Bodie et al. (1988) based their model of the DB plan on their view of the corporate 
liability assumed by the plan sponsor.  This view has some implications for the labor 
market that have not been demonstrated empirically.  By recognizing the existence of 
implicit contracts in the labor market, we are able to use a contribution schedule for the 
DB plan that we believe is more realistic than the one assumed by Bodie et al. (1988).    
 
The lifecycle model that our paper uses draws on the consumption-savings literature 
launched by Deaton (1991).  He examined infinite-horizon models of consumption where 
wage risk is unhedgeable and possibly autocorrelated.  Many different authors have used 
similar models to examine issues in consumption and saving in the presence of  4    
unhedgeable background risk.  Carroll (1992,1997a,1997b) and Carroll and Samwick 
(1998) examine ‘buffer-stock’ savings behaviour and the interest elasticity of saving; 
Heaton and Lucas (1996, 1997) look at the impact of unhedgeable background risk on 
portfolio choice; Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) investigate the impact of a social 
welfare system on individual saving; and Campbell et al. (2000) study risk aspects of an 
investment-based social security system.  In all these studies, the authors model 
individuals making decisions about consumption and saving given the fact that they face 
substantial labor income risk that is unhedgeable due to incomplete financial markets.  
The models of Carroll and Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes do not allow for a risky asset or 
an endogenous asset mix.  The focus of the present paper is on the flow of risks through 
available institutional mechanisms of retirement saving, making it essential to use a 
model that was designed to examine the issue of retirement saving and that allows for 
investment risk.   This makes the model of Campbell et al. (2000) a natural choice.   The 
models of Heaton and Lucas (1996, 1997, 2000) use a similar approach (although their 
focus is more on consumption and saving than specifically on retirement) and should 
therefore give answers that are qualitatively similar. 
 
The present paper is a first step on the road towards the ultimate goal of designing and 
fitting a model to explain the wide diversity of the pension environment.  Such a model 
will be useful in designing pension systems for future generations in both the United 
States and other countries, and in understanding more fully the economic role of different 
types of retirement benefit plans.   
 
The first section of this paper discusses the DB and DC pension models that were 
developed here, while the second section describes the rest of the economy.  The third 
section describes the way in which the model was solved; the fourth section presents 
some results; and the fifth section outlines possible model extensions and a conclusion.   
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2.  Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Pension Plans 
 
Defined Benefit Plan 
 
The worker is assumed to contribute to a defined benefit pension plan over his working 
life and to receive benefits from the plan when he retires.   The date of retirement, and 
labor supply in general, is assumed to be exogenous, following most of the consumption-
savings literature.
2   
 
The defined benefit pension benefit is assumed to be a constant real proportion κ of final 
wages for each year of service.  The proportion is assumed to be chosen endogenously by 
the individual when offered the choice to join the DB plan, which may be at the 
beginning of working life, or later: 
 
          0 ti t Pt W i κ + =∀ > %       ( 1 )  
 
This is a simplified version of a typical DB benefit formula as discussed by Mitchell 
(2000).
3   
 
Consistent with theoretical models of the labor market (see, for example, Bulow, 1981 
and Bulow and Scholes, 1983) it is assumed that workers pay for defined benefit 
pensions in the form of lower cash wages.  When the individual joins the plan, the 
expected discounted present value of pension contributions is chosen to equal his 
expected discounted present value of pension benefits.  This makes the simplifying 
                                                 
2  As discussed by Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992) this assumption may have implications for optimal 
investment and pension strategies.   
3  Most DB plans pay benefits based on an average of the last few years of service, rather than on just the 
last year, as we assume here.  In addition, many DB plans further reduce the variability of the benefit by 
excluding highly variable compensation (such as sales commissions) from the wages used in the benefit 
formula.  These complications are ignored in this paper for simplicity.    6    
assumption that there are no ex ante cross subsidies in the pension plan, even though 
these are not unusual in defined benefit pension schemes.
4    
 
Two further issues must be considered when determining contributions to defined benefit 
pensions plans.  The first is whether contributions are increasing, level, or decreasing 
over time as a proportion of wages.  Bodie et al. (1988) model contributions as an 
increasing proportion of wages in order to reflect their view that the value of the 
corporate pension promise is the termination benefit offered under the plan rules.   
Nevertheless, this view of DB pensions implies steeply declining cash wages near 
retirement, and temporary dips in cash wages when an individual’s pension vests.  This is 
rejected empirically by Kotlikoff and Wise (1985), Pesando (1985), and others.   
 
An extensive literature on implicit labor contracts and DB pension plans, summarized in 
Ippolito (1985, 1997) presents the DB pension contract as a long-term implicit contract.  
The terms of the contract are that the pension plan sponsor promises not to terminate the 
plan, in exchange for requiring plan members to pay contributions that are higher than the 
level required to finance the termination benefit.  The purpose of these higher 
contributions (called the ‘pension bond’ in the literature) is to attract lower discounting 
and longer tenure workers to the firm.  This is in the interests of the firm because longer 
tenure workers have a greater incentive to accrue firm-specific human capital.  These 
arguments are summarized in Lazear (1979, 1982).  By encouraging higher earlier 
pension contributions, the presence of implicit labor contracts in DB pension plans would 
tend to imply a more level contribution rate than that assumed by Bodie et al. (1988). 
 
For this reason, and for theoretical simplicity, we model the level of contributions as a 
constant fraction of wages:      
 
          0 jj Pc W j t =− ∀ < ≤ %       ( 2 )  
 
                                                 
4  An example of a common ex ante subsidy is that between men and women.  Women have lower 
mortality and hence may earn more valuable benefits.  The true extend of cross subsidies is often difficult 
to measure.  See Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) for an analysis of redistribution in Social Security.  7    
Note that the sign in the equation is negative to indicate that these contributions are paid 
out of wages; benefits have a positive sign.  The assumption of a level contribution 
schedule probably overestimates the extent to which DB pension plans expose members 
to wage risk.  This is because with an increasing contribution schedule, more 
contributions are made later when more is known about the final level of wages and 
hence benefits.  Thus, contributions and benefits are more likely to be closer together 
when the contribution schedule is increasing than when the contribution schedule is flat 
or decreasing.   
 
The level of contributions as a proportion of wages in this model is given by c.  In order 
for the pension to be fully self-financing in expected value, the value of c must depend on 
the level of investment return the company is willing to guarantee the individual, in 
exchange for assuming the risk of fluctuating wages.  There is a wide literature on this 
(see Babbell et al., 2002, for a summary), that discusses the risks that firms assume by 
providing defined-benefit-type guarantees to employees, and the accuracy with which 
these risks are reflected on company balance sheets.  To sidestep this controversy, here 
we examine defined benefit pension plans in the situation where various levels of 
‘guarantee’ are provided by the corporation.  A guarantee of the risk-free rate has the 
effect of assuming that the employer can diversify wage fluctuations away fully, or that 
the firm’s aggregate real wage bill is uncorrelated with the risky asset.  If the firm’s wage 
bill is positively correlated with the risky asset, a higher rate of guarantee can be safely 
granted.
5     
 
It should be noted that one of the advantages of DB plans from the viewpoint of the 
corporate sponsor is that DB plans afford it greater control over employees’ retirement 
behavior.  Presumably, this has some value to the employer, implying that some 
guarantee above the risk-free rate is not unreasonable.  Dorsey et al. (1998) state that 
employees would also not accept this restriction on their retirement options unless the 
firm could pay higher cash wages to compensate, possibly due to higher productivity of 
                                                 
5 A more complete analysis, beyond the scope of this paper, could examine the correlation between the 
aggregate wage bill of a corporation and various risk factors identified in the empirical finance literature 
(see, for example, Fama and French, 1996).  8    
pension-covered workers (Dorsey et al., 1998 present some evidence on this), the lower 
turnover of workers in pension-covered jobs (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1995; Allen, 
Clark and McDermed, 1993), or the sorting effect of pensions (Ippolito, 1997).  From the 
point of view of the employee, this could appear as though the firm were discounting 
pension benefits at a higher rate than the risk-free rate.  This effect is shown in a stylized 
way in Figure 1.  Bodie et al. (1988) assumed that the corporate sponsor could fully 
diversify the impact of wage fluctuations, and that pensions had no productivity, tenure 
or sorting effects, implying that DB pensions and contributions should be discounted at 
the risk-free rate. 
 
This paper will use the risk-free rate as a base and will examine the impact on individual 
portfolio choice if the company is able to provide a slightly larger guarantee, or if the 
presence of a pension increases worker productivity and hence wages.   
 
It will be assumed that the corporation will not default on its promises, although the 
analysis can easily be modified to include partial or full default.  In the United States, the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation provides a federal guarantee for most of the 
liabilities of defined benefit plans (Ippolito, 1989).   
 
In this model, the corporation pools the pension contributions of individual workers 
(eliminating wage fluctuations) and uses these to purchase longer-dated risk-free bonds 
that will pay pension benefits.  It is impossible for individuals to do this as they cannot 
hedge away their wage risk due to incomplete markets.  If interest rates were variable, the 
corporation could issue bonds at time 0, guaranteed by the future pension contributions of 
its workers, and use the proceeds to purchase much longer-dated bonds to pay benefits.  
The corporation could redeem its own debt with the employee pension contributions as 




  9    
Defined Contribution Plan 
 
In this paper, we do not model the DC plan assets separately from the other assets of the 
individual.   The DC plan forms part of the assets of the individual and can be invested in 
stocks and bonds with the worker’s other assets.  The individual is also free to spend 
down assets if so desired.   
 
There are several reasons for this.  The first is that for simplicity we have not modeled tax 
incentives for pension saving, or, stated more accurately, tax disincentives for saving 
outside pension plans.  An accurate specification of the tax code would involve 
complications that are beyond the scope of this paper.  In addition, while there is 
evidence that DB plans pay a slightly higher rate of tax than DC plans (see Ippolito, 
1989), both types of plan are largely tax-exempt and thus the effects of introducing 
taxation would be similar for both plan types.  If taxation were introduced, some form of 
rationing of the tax privilege would need to be modeled, adding further complications.  
The second reason is that if DC plan assets were segregated from other assets, in this 
model the optimal level of DC plan would be zero.  This is because DC plan assets would 
be invested in the same assets as non DC plan assets, but unavailable for consumption 
before retirement.
6    Finally, very few DC plans in the US compel members to annuitize 
their assets at retirement and less than 25% offer any life annuity option at retirement at 
all (Mitchell, 1999).   Many (especially 401(k) plans) permit members to borrow against 
accumulated assets.  These facts reduce the relevance of segregating the assets of the DC 
plan.   
 
To prevent the desire of individuals for annuities from biasing the estimated desirability 
of DB plans upwards, workers are permitted to access the annuity market when they 
retire.  However, unlike DB plan annuities, whose benefit level is chosen when workers 
join the DB plan, the level of the private annuity can be chosen at retirement.  To allow 
for adverse selection, (see Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002 and Mitchell et al., 1999 for 
                                                 
6 As DB plans provide access to a security not available in the markets (notably, wage-indexed claims), the 
same result does not hold for DB plans.    10    
evidence on the presence of adverse selection in annuities markets) the private annuity is 
not priced neutrally.  Letting Y be the amount of income the individual obtains from the 
annuity, and the price loading for adverse selection in the private annuity market beλ , 



















=+ + ∑ .       ( 3 )  
 
R is the rate at which annuity payments are discounted (assumed to be the risk-free rate as 
an individual’s mortality is uncorrelated with the risky asset) and the assumed probability 
the individual is alive at time i conditional on being alive at time 0 is given by i π . 
 
 
3. Model  description 
 
A utility maximizing individual works for t periods and then is retired for s periods.  As 
stated above, labor supply is assumed to be exogenous.    At the beginning of each period, 
the individual earns a real risky wage Wj, consumes Cj, and has assets on hand of Aj.  
Between period j-1 and period j, the individual earns a return on assets of Rj.  All 
variables with subscript j are revealed at time j.  The model structure is summarised in 
Table 1. 
 




A variety of different models of income uncertainty is used in the stochastic income 
literature (see Pemberton, 1997).  There are three main features to all of these models: 
wages are assumed to be exogenous, to persist over time, and to fluctuate around a 
permanent income level which may shift over an individual’s working life.  To model  11    
these facts, it is conventional to describe the level of the wage, j W %  (earned at the 
beginning of each period), as:   
 
   exp( ) jj Ww = % % ,          ( 4 )  
 
where  j w %  consists of three components.   
 
The first is a deterministic function that represents the unconditional expected value of 
wages at time j, an individual’s permanent income, which is often modeled as a function 
of demographic variables such as the individual’s age, educational achievement and 
whether or not the individual is head of a household.   The second is a permanent error to 
model shifts in the level of permanent income over an individual’s working life.  For 
convenience, this permanent error is assumed to follow an AR(1) process that is either a 
unit-root process or close to a unit-root process to capture the persistence of wages over 
time.  To model fluctuation around permanent income, there is also assumed to be a 
transient error that, for convenience, is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 
zero.
7   This process may be described by the following equations:  
 
    ( , )       1    jj j wf j j t ν ε =+ + ∀ ≤ ≤ Z %% %       ( 5 )  
1 1 jj j j t ν θν ξ − =+ ∀ ≤ ≤ % %%        ( 6 )  
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     (8) 
 
where  (, ) f j Z  is the individual’s permanent income which may depend on a vector of 
demographic variables Z;  j ν %  is the permanent error; and j ε %  the temporary error. The term 
θ  controls the degree of persistence of the permanent income shocks, and  j η %  is the stock 
                                                 
7  Some authors model a degree of persistence in the transient error as well (see for instance Zeldes, 1989 
and MaCurdy, 1982), which is ignored here for convenience.    12    
return at time j (possibly correlated with the permanent error in wages) to be explained 
below. 
  
The adjustments to the means of  j ν % , j ε % , and  j η %  of half their variances ensure that: 
 




At the beginning of each period j the consumer is assumed to have a stock of assets Aj.  
He can choose what portion j α of this to invest in the risky asset, and what portion 
1 j α − to invest in the risk free asset.  Aj is constrained to be greater than 0, implying that 
the individual cannot borrow against his defined benefit pension plan, and the individual 
is not permitted to short either the risky or the risk-free asset, implying that 0 1 j α ≤≤ . 
 
The instantaneous return on the risk-free asset in all time periods is given by R. 
 
The instantaneous return on the risky asset in time j is given by j µ η + % , where the joint 
distribution of  j η %  and  j ξ %  is given in equation (8).
8 
 
The formula above implies that there may be a correlation between the permanent portion 
of an individual’s income shocks and the returns on the risky asset. 
 
The return on an individual’s portfolio is given by: 
 
                                                 
8 Campbell and Viciera (1999) have modeled the case where the equity risk premium is time-variant and 
there is some predictability in asset returns.  The issue of time-varying returns may affect pension choice in 
that individuals may be more likely to choose DB plans when DC plans are expected to produce lower 
returns.  However, as a first assumption, this model will adopt the approach of assuming a constant equity 
risk premium. 
  
   13    
11 [exp( ) exp( )] exp( ) jj j R RR R αµ η ++ =+ + − + % % .    (10) 
 
This equation assumes that the individual balances his portfolio only at the beginning of 
the year, rather than continuously.   The standard adjustment to the mean of  1 j η + %  ensures 
that: 
 
1 [ ] exp( ) (1 )exp( ) jj j ER R R αµ α + =+ + − %      ( 1 1 )  
 
Assuming that the individual consumes Cj at time j, the transition equation for the assets 
of the individual is: 
 







= ≤ otherwise   0     
         1
1
t j
t j .       ( 1 3 )  
 
Equation (12) assumes that after cash flows in period j, the individual has assets 
(Deaton’s (1991) ‘cash-on-hand’) that equal the assets in period j before cash flows, less 
consumption in period j plus income in period j.  If the individual is working, income 
equals wages less pension contributions.  These assets, plus investment income received 
on them over the year, comprise the individual’s assets or cash-on-hand before cash flows 
in period j+1. 
 
Just after retirement, the individual has the option to spend Bt+1 on buying an annuity in 
the private market, as discussed in the section on DC plans above.  The definition of Bt+1 
is given in equation (3).  Then the asset transfer equation between times t and t+1 is 
given by: 
  14    
11 1 ( )       0 tt t t t t t AR A C W P B ++ + =− + + − > %%      ( 1 4 )  
 
The constraint on At+1 implies a constraint on Bt+1.   
 
During retirement the individual receives and income equal to his DB pension plus his 
annuity income. 
 
This, income in retirement is given by: 
 
tt i Yt W Y P κ + += + %         ( 1 5 )  
 
The asset transfer equation for assets during retirement is then given by: 
 





At time 0, the individual is assumed to maximize a time-separable expected utility 
function of the following form: 
 
0 {, , }
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C u , 1 ≥ γ ,         ( 1 8 )  
  15    
and  i π  is the assumed probability the individual is alive at time i conditional on being 
alive at time 0.  This implies that at time 0, the individual chooses the level of κ  (the 
defined benefit plan accrual rate), C0 (his consumption at time 0) and  0 α  (the asset mix 
of his portfolio at time 0).  At each time thereafter, the individual will choose only Cj  
(his consumption at time j) and  j α  (the asset mix of his portfolio) conditional on the 
chosen value of κ .   At time t, the individual chooses the value Y (the amount of the 
private market annuity).  
 
The parameters of the model are thus: 
222 ,, , , , ,,,,,,,, R f εξηξ η θ σσσσ ρ µ γ β π λ Z  where the 
other parameters may depend on elements of Z. 
 
Some elements of this model (the wage process, the asset process and the choice of utility 
function) follow Campbell et al. (2000).  The model in this paper is also closely related to 
the ‘buffer-stock saving’ model of Carroll (1992).  An issue to consider when using 
lifetime consumption models that include a risky asset is that most models of this type 
fail to match both consumption-savings profiles and observed asset mixes.  This is the 
case even when high fixed costs of participating in the equity market are assumed and 
risk aversion is very high.  The reason for this is the historically high equity risk 
premium, examined by Mehra and Prescott (1985) and many others.  This paper, like 
many others in this literature, will not attempt to resolve this paradox, which is 
heightened by the presence of labor income driving individuals to hold stocks.     
 
 
4. Model  Solution 
 
This section describes the techniques used to solve the model, similar to those adopted by 
Carroll (1997a).   
 
Derivation of Euler Equations 
  16    
In the last period, the individual consumes all assets.  Thus, 
 
  ts ts ts ts ts CA t W Y A P Y κ ++ + + + =+ + =++       ( 1 9 )  
 
Let  1 t X PY + =+ , the worker’s (constant) income in retirement.  Then, in retirement, the 
value function is a function of two state variables, X and At+i.  In the last period: 
 
(, )( ) ts ts ts VAXu A X ++ + =+         ( 2 0 )  
 
In other periods, the individual must balance future consumption and present 
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s.t.   jj CAX ≤ +       ( 2 1 )  
 
At time t+1, the year after retirement, the individual must decide how much of his wealth 
to annuitize by solving the following problem: 
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       t X tW Y κ = + ,       ( 2 3 )   17    
 
where Y is the optimal value chosen in equation (22) for each level of DB pension and 
wealth. 
 
Before time t, the value function is a function of three state variables, Ai,  i ε  and  i ν .  At 
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s.t.   jjj j CA WP ≤ ++        
 
To avoid repetition, only the derivations of results for the more complex pre-retirement 
time periods will be shown.  Results at and after retirement can easily be obtained by 
following the same procedure.   
 
Ignoring constraints on consumption, the F.O.C. for consumption is: 
 
1 ''
11 1 1 1 ˆˆ () ( ( ) , , )
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jj j j j j j j j j j
j





++ + + + =− + + %% % % ,     (25) 
 
where “‘” denotes differentiation w.r.t. the first argument of the function to which it is 
applied.   
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which implies that: 
  18    
'' ˆ () (,,) jj j j j uC V A v ε = , or that 
''
11 1 1 1 ˆ () (,,) jj j j j uC V A v ε ++ + + + = .  (27) 
           
Combining (25) and (27) gives the Euler Equation for consumption: 
 
1 ''









++ = % .        ( 2 8 )  
 
Similar arguments show that equation (28) applies at all other time periods except the last 
period. 
 
Again ignoring constraints, the F.O.C for asset allocation is: 
 
'
11 1 1 1





11 1 1 1
ˆ 0 [(exp( ) 1) ( ( 1 1 ), , )] jj j j j j j j t j j t j j EV R A C W P Y v µη ε ++ + ≤ > + + =+ − − + + + % %% % . (30) 
 
The two F.O.C.’s (30) and (28) need to be solved simultaneously for  ˆ j α  and  ˆ
j C . 
 
In order to do this, define a function: 
 





11 1 1 1 (, ,,) [ ( , , , ) ]
s
jj jjj jj j jj jj j sv E R V R s v αε αε ++ + + + Ω= %% % % ,      ( 3 2 )  
 
and   19    
 
'
11 1 1 1 ( , , , ) [(exp( ) exp( )) ( , , , )] jj jjj j j j jj jj j sv E R R V R s v
α αε µη αε ++ + + + Ω= + + − % %% % .(33) 
 
Equations (32) and (33) in conjunction with the envelope theorem argument used above, 
imply that  
  
'
11 1 1 1 ˆ ( , , , ) [ ( [ , , , ])]
s





11 1 1 1 ˆ ( , , , ) [(exp( ) exp( )) ( [ , , , ])] jj jjj j j j jj jj j sv E R R u C R s v
α αε µη αε ++ + + + Ω= + + − % %% %  
          ( 3 5 )  
 
Hence, the F.O.C.’s can be rewritten as 
 
1 ' ˆˆ ˆ () ( ,,,)
j s
jj j j j j j
j








         ˆ ˆ 0( , , , ) jj j jjj sC v
α αε =Ω − .        ( 3 7 )  
 
These four equations (34, 35, 36 and 37), along with the solution for the first retirement 
period, can be used recursively to obtain the optimal consumption rule for all time 
periods except time t, the date of retirement.  The first retirement period solution is 
obtained by recursively solving four similar equations, starting at the last period, and then 
solving for the optimal annuitisation strategy.  While technically the individual solves the 
annuitisation, consumption and asset allocation decisions in this time period 
simultaneously, these decisions can be solved as sequential decisions. 
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Note that the constraint 0 j A ≥  is binding when 
 
' ˆ () ( 0 , , , )
s




'1 ˆ [( 0 , , , ) ]
s
jj j j j j j Au v P W βα ε
− =Ω − −   and  ˆ 0( 0 , , , ) jj j j v
α αε =Ω .   (39) 
 
The constraint 0 1 j α ≤≤  is binding when the unconstrained solution lies outside the 





The Gaussian random variables were discretised by following the approach of Carroll 
(1992).  His technique was extended to permit multiple, correlated random variables by 
discretising the variables in sequence and using conditional distributions where 
appropriate.   
 
The Euler equations were solved numerically using a Newton-Raphson method.  The 
value functions and the derivative of the value functions were approximately linearized 
by the use of appropriate power transformations.  This reduced the number of sample 
points in the grid that were required to estimate the value functions accurately.  The 
technique was effective provided that the values at which the constraints bind were 
included in the grid of values for which the function  ( , , , ) jj jjj sv α ε Ω  (defined in 
equation 31) was estimated.   The interpolation over the values of the state variable 
i ν was performed using exponential interpolation to reflect the fact that its value affects 
income in an exponential way, while i ε  was modeled as a lognormal, multiplicative 
random variable of income to avoid this problem.    21    
 
The asset mix was chosen first for each level of consumption and each combination of 
the state variables.  Then, the optimal level of consumption was chosen for each 
combination of the state variables.  This technique used the principle of dynamic 
programming applied over different choice variables rather than over different time 
periods.  It offered improved computation time and reliability over a simulataneous 
solution of the Euler equations.  The same approach was used to determine the optimal 
annuitization strategy at retirement. 
 
The optimal value of κ was chosen by means of an optimization algorithm over the 
values of  00 0 0 (,,) VA ν ε , corresponding to different levels of income and wealth.   The 
optimization procedure used either cubic spline interpolation or linear bisection of the 
estimated value function derivatives, conditional on whether the cubic spline 
interpolation produced results that lay inside the bisection interval.       
 
The solution was implemented in a combination of Matlab and C++.  The problem of 
retirement was solved only once (using the technique of state variable reduction) and 
stored for each set of parameters, allowing pre-retirement runs to be performed fairly 
rapidly.   
 
 
5.  Assumptions and Results 
 
The assumptions used by the model are laid out in Table 2.    
 
Table 2 here. 
 
The model assumes an equity risk premium of 4% p.a., lower than historical market 
values would suggest.  The standard deviation of equity returns is in line with historical 
values of 15.7% p.a.  The benchmark risk aversion used is 5, slightly higher than many 
authors have used.  These three assumptions are chosen to ensure that the benchmark  22    
proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset is not too far from observed values (see 
Heaton and Lucas, 2000).  The presence of labor income (and pension income in 




Many authors (Carroll, 1992, Carroll and Samwick, 1997 and 1998, Heaton and Lucas, 
2000, and Campbell et al., 2000) have examined the PSID and obtained estimates of 
earnings volatility and wage profiles.  There is thus little value added by performing 
another analysis of the same dataset in this context.  For the estimates of the variance of 
permanent income shocks, I have decided to use the estimates of Campbell et al. (1999), 
which is approximately 30% higher than the estimates used by other researchers.  For the 
temporary shock variance, I use a value higher than that used by Carroll (1992) and 
Heaton and Lucas (2000), but a lower estimate than obtained by Campbell et al. (2000).   
It should be noted that measurement error can have a large effect on estimates of 
temporary variance in earnings.  Most DB pension plans use an average of the last few 
years’ income to determine the pension benefit, rather than the last year as we have 
assumed here, which will average out wage fluctuations.  These facts allow a lower 
estimate of the temporary variance of income shocks to be used in this context. 
 
Figure 2 here. 
 
The shape of the wage profile seems to have a small impact on the results, and hence the 
profile obtained by Campbell et al. (2000) from the PSID for college-educated students 
was chosen.    This wage profile is shown in Figure 2.  Some studies that provide 
aggregate estimates for the covariance of permanent wage shocks and risky asset returns 
include Heaton and Lucas (1997), who estimate this correlation at the individual level 
and find that most workers have a correlation of between -0.1 and 0.2 between wage 
shocks and the risky asset.  They do not state the sampling distribution of their estimated 
                                                 
9  A standard benchmark used is Merton (1969)’s result that, in the absence of labor income, the proportion 
of wealth invested in the risky asset equals 
2 /( )
η µ σγ  in the notation of this model.  For these parameter 
values, this is approximately 1/3.  23    
correlation.  Davis and Willen (2000) estimate this correlation for different professions 
and find typically small positive values except for individuals who are self employed.    
For this paper, we are thus justified in assuming a small positive value for this parameter, 
following Campbell et al. (2000).  
 
Figure 4 here. 
   
Figure 4 shows the solution of this model for a worker who enters the labor force at age 
23 for the assumptions described above.  This worker is assumed to contribute nothing to 
the pension plan, so κ = 0.  The graph shows the worker’s annual earnings, asset 
holdings, consumption, and asset mix between equities and bonds.  This figure assumes 
that all random variables equal their expected values in each time period.  As expected, 
just before retirement, when human capital has been exhausted, the individual’s equity 
holdings are approximately 1/3.  The worker’s assets fall dramatically at retirement as the 
annuity is purchased.   After retirement, the riskless annuity crowds out all bond 
holdings.  In early years, the individual saves very little, but starts to save for retirement 
from around age 30. 
  
The optimal values of κ  are presented in two separate tables.  Table 3 shows the impact 
of an individual’s time horizon and initial wealth on the choice to participate in a DB 
pension scheme, and is illustrated graphically in Figure 4.  Table 4 shows the sensitivity 
of the optimal DB choice to various assumptions.   
 
Table 3 here. 
 
The results show that at early ages, DB pension plans are not a desirable vehicle for 
retirement saving.  Even for relatively wealthy individuals, shown in the third column of 
Table 3, the optimal DB replacement rate for individuals younger than age 45 is 0.  There 
are three reasons for this.  The first is that the return on the DB benefit (the risk free rate 
plus the 10% adverse selection cost, spread over the number of years to retirement) is too 
low relative to its variance.  The variance equals the variance of the final year’s earnings  24    
conditional on the state variables at the time the decision is made.  For an individual aged 
25, the variance of earnings over 40 years is simply too large to justify returns that are 
close to the risk-free rate.   The second reason is that when he is young, the worker has 
most of his wealth invested in human capital, which is highly correlated with the final 
benefit of the DB plan.  For younger individuals, equities provide an opportunity to 
diversify away from human capital.  As the individual ages, human capital is converted 
into financial wealth, and his wage uncertainty is resolved.  This implies that the 
diversification value of DB pension plans increases and the variability of the final benefit 
decreases.  Hence, we would expect that, as shown in Table 3, (illustrated in Figure 4) as 
the individual nears retirement, DB plans become progressively more attractive.  The 
final reason causing DB plans to become more attractive as workers near retirement is 
that the annual rate of return on the DB plan increases.  This is because the fixed benefit 
of participating in the group annuity market through the DB plan as opposed to in the 
(unfair) private market is spread over fewer years.   
 
The results in Table 3 show that the advantages of DB plans for older workers are very 
large.   For instance, a 57 year-old individual with financial wealth equal to 5 times his 
current earnings, has an optimal DB replacement rate of 35% - a huge number 
considering that he only has 8 working years to contribute to the pension plan.  For older 
individuals, the benefits of DB plans are so substantial that the model predicts that 
workers would invest most or all of their earnings in these plans if given the opportunity.  
This is illustrated by the optimal DB replacement rates marked by asterisks, which 
indicate that workers are constrained from investing more than their entire earnings in 
their DB plan.  While this is admittedly unrealistic, it illustrates the value that workers 
near retirement place on DB plans:  DB plans diversify the asset portfolio out of financial 
markets and provide cheap access to the market for life annuities.   
 
Table 3 also shows how the optimal DB pension plan replacement rate varies by the 
initial financial wealth of the individual at the time the option is given to participate in the 
DB plan.    The higher his initial wealth relative to income, the greater the proportion of 
total wealth (including human capital) that is invested in financial capital and hence the  25    
greater the diversification benefit of investing in the DB plan.  If wealth is higher, the 
individual can also sacrifice a greater proportion of earnings into the DB plan without 
adversely affecting consumption. 
 
Figure 5 here. 
 
Figure 6 here. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 show the consumption-earnings profiles from age 56 for the base case of 
the model when the worker chooses no DB pension plan and when the worker chooses 
the optimum level of the DB pension plan, respectively.  Again, both these figures 
assume that all random variables equal their expected values.   
 
Figure 5 shows that the individual with no DB plan accumulates around $300 000 just 
before retirement, and has approximately 1/3 of this invested in the risky asset, as 
expected.  At retirement, the individual purchases an annuity on the private market that 
gives him a replacement rate of about 45%.  After retirement, this annuity crowds out his 
bond holdings and all assets are held in the risky asset thereafter. 
 
Figure 6 shows the same profiles for an individual who chooses the optimum DB 
participation rate at that age.  This figure shows two lines for income – one before the 
pension contributions are deducted and the pension annuity is received, and one after this 
is done.  Several features of this graph stand out in comparison with Figure 4.  Firstly, 
this individual has only about $180 000 in financial assets before retirement because the 
DB plan has crowded out other savings.  This crowd-out comes disproportionately from 
bonds, which now represent only around 40% of the individual’s portfolio just before 
retirement.  At retirement, the worker buys an annuity on the private market with a 
replacement rate of only 20%.  The optimal DB replacement rate for the base case is 28% 
(read off Table 3), implying that the total replacement rate for this individual is 48%.  
The reason that this is higher than the individual who did not participate in the DB plan is 
that the DB annuity is cheaper than the private market annuity.  As before, the annuities  26    
crowd out all the bond holdings in retirement and this retiree holds only bonds until the 
end of his life. 
 
Table 4 shows the sensitivity of the optimal DB replacement rate to various parameters in 
the model.  The sensitivity of the model to time to retirement and initial wealth have 
already been discussed.   
 
Table 4 here. 
 
Table 4 shows that the factors affecting the desirability of DB pension plans most are the 
annuity loading, the wage variability factor and the DB guarantee.   
 
If the private annuity market loading falls, DB plans become much less attractive.  In the 
case that the private annuity market is actuarially fair, the optimal DB replacement rate is 
0.  This is because the DB plan pays the risk-free rate but provides a risky benefit and is 
fully dominated by the risk-free asset.  We would expect DB pension plans to be more 
common in environments where private annuity markets are inefficient.   
 
As wage variability increases, the optimal DB replacement rate falls.  This is because the 
riskiness of the DB benefit increases as wage variability increases.  We expect DB plans 
to be more common in industries where wage variability is lower – such as governments 
and large corporations.    
 
If the DB guarantee increases, the optimal DB replacement rate increases.  This is 
because the expected value of the DB benefit increases while its variance remains 
unchanged.  We therefore expect that DB plans would be more prevalent in industries 
where the aggregate wage bill is highly correlated with the risky asset or where the 
employer is willing to pay a premium to control the retirement behavior of employees.   
 
The remaining factors affect the desirability of DB pension plans, but less dramatically.    27    
An increase in risk aversion causes the optimal DB pension plan replacement rate to fall.  
This produces the surprising result that DB plans are more attractive to individuals who 
are less risk averse – at least over the range of risk aversion examined here.  This 
conclusion is in line with the conclusion of Bodie et al. (1988).  The shape of the 
earnings profile (as altered by the productivity parameter) has a small impact on the 
optimal level of DB earnings.  As earnings growth increases, the optimal DB replacement 
rate falls slightly, possibly because increased earnings growth reduces saving in general 
and increases the absolute level of the final benefit.  An increase in the equity risk 
premium causes the optimal DB replacement rate to fall because the attractiveness of the 
main investment alternative – equities – is increased.  The rate of time preference has 
only a very small impact on the desirability of DB pension plans.       
 
The model shows that under a variety of assumptions, DB plans can provide value to 
individuals nearing retirement - primarily by providing additional diversification out of 
the financial markets and cheaper access to annuities markets.  For individuals more than 
about 15-20 years from retirement, however, the value of DB plans is likely to be small 
due to high wage uncertainty, the low annual return required to compensate for the 
cheaper access that DB plans provide to annuities markets, and the high proportion of the 
total wealth of younger workers that is invested in their human capital.   
 
  
Extensions and conclusion 
 





A possible advantage of DB plans over DC plans is that they provide individuals who 
have long working histories a benefit with a stable replacement ratio.  This would make 
DB plans more attractive if individuals have habit-formation-type preferences.  This  28    
model could easily be extended and results obtained for habit formation utility functions, 




An important source of retirement income for most people in the US is Social Security, 
which is a re-indexed career-average defined benefit plan with some redistributive 
aspects.   Baxter (2001) examines Social Security as a financial asset, and she finds 
surprisingly low correlations between Social Security benefits and final wages.  Her work 
implies that the diversification element of DB plans identified here would still be 
valuable if Social Security were included.  However, because Social Security also 
provides access to the annuities market, DB plans may well be crowded out by Social 
Security, as discussed by Mitchell et al. (1999).  The model presented here could easily 
be extended by forcing individuals to pay an amount of their pay, sufficient to provide 
replacement ratios similar to Social Security, into an account that provides them with an 
annuity at a group rate.  The attractiveness of DB pensions could be examined as a 
function of the replacement rate provided by Social Security.    
  
Annuity demand models 
 
The annuity demand model in this paper is relatively unsophisticated.   Other authors 
(see, for example Mitchell et al. (1999)) have modeled much more complicated demand 
models, including such aspects as bequest motives, medical expenses and housing – all of 
which may reduce the demand for annuities.  The high value of annuities implied by our 
model may overstate the value of defined benefit plans’ provision of access to an 
actuarially fair annuity.  Alternatively, the fact that annuity rates vary considerably over 
time adds a further dimension of risk to the private annuity market that could easily be 
modeled.   
 
Mandatory DC plan 
  29    
Finally, it is important to examine the case of forced saving.  In many countries with 
mandatory DC pension plans (see Piggott (2002)) individuals are forced to save for 
retirement from an early age.  It is probable that the diversification element of DB plans 
would still be useful for individuals nearing retirement, although the annuitisation 
advantage of DB plans would no longer hold if annuitisation were mandatory in the DC 
system.    It is also possible that the forced savings in the DC plan would crowd out some 




This paper has identified conditions under which workers use a defined benefit pension to 
help bear investment and wage risk.   At the levels of wage risk assumed here, wage 
indexed claims are not a suitable vehicle for retirement savings for young individuals.  
This is because investment in stocks over the lifecycle is expected to fully dominate a 
wage-indexed defined benefit plan.  But a defined benefit plan does offer a valuable 
alternative to workers nearing retirement.  For such individuals, the risks of a defined 
benefit plan are likely to be smaller, as most wage variability has already been resolved.   
Further, the returns are likely to be higher than for younger workers, as the benefit of 
cheaper access to annuities markets is spread over a smaller number of years.  In 
addition, because individuals have relatively little of their wealth in human capital, and 
instead hold more financial assets, the diversification of wealth out of financial markets 
can be extremely valuable at older ages. 
 
Our results also show that DB plans are more valuable if financial wealth is higher 
relative to income; if wage variability is lower; if access to private annuities markets is 
expensive and if the equity risk premium is lower.   
 
These results suggest that a retirement policy that encourages firms to allow older 
workers to join defined benefit plans, or a national wage-linked social security system for 
older workers will be welfare enhancing.  This is particularly true in countries where  30    
annuity markets are poorly developed, or where equity markets are risky and provide low 
expected returns. 
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Table 1:  Model Schematics 
 
 Working  period  Retirement  period 
Time  1 2  … t  t+1 …  t+s 
Income  W1  W2 …  Wt 0 … 0 
Wealth  A1 A 2 …  At A t+1 … At+s 
Pension  P1  P2 …  Pt P t+1 … Pt+s 
Consumption  C1 C 2 …  Ct C t+1 … Ct+s 
Risky Asset Return   R 2  … Rt R t+1 … Rt+s 
 
Notes to Table 1: 
 
At each time period the individual chooses how much to consume and how much to save from current 
income.  The asset mix of savings (between bonds and equities) can be adjusted each period.   Income is 
stochastic with permanent and temporary errors.  Risky asset returns are assumed to be lognormally 
distributed with a constant mean and variance.  
 
At time 0, the individual chooses whether to join a DB pension plan and can choose the annual accrual rate.  
The DB pension plan pays a pension benefit equal to the annual accrual rate multiplied by the individual’s 
length of service (t in this model) multiplied by the individual’s final wage.  This pension benefit is paid 
annually until death.  Once this choice is made, the individual cannot opt out of the DB pension plan.  The 
individual pays a level proportion of wages to the pension plan, where the proportion is chosen so that the 
expected discounted present value of contributions equals the expected discounted present value of benefits 
at some interest rate.   The DB pension plan does not pay a lump sum benefit. 
 
At retirement, the individual can choose to purchase an annuity from private savings on the private market.  
To model the costs of adverse selection, the annuity is not priced fairly but has a multiplicative loading 
factor incorporated into the price.  This annuity pays a level annual pension for life.  The individual can 
purchase an annuity regardless of whether he participated in the DB plan. 
 
There is no bequest motive, labor supply is assumed to be exogenous and the individual is not permitted to 
borrow either stocks or bonds. 
 





























,  1 γ ≥ , and 
i π is the assumed probability the individual is alive at time i conditional on being alive at time 0.  38    
 
Table 2:  Description of model assumptions. 
 
Assumption  
Risk aversion  5 
Time preference  4% 
Risk-free Interest rate  2% 
Equity risk premium  4% 
Equity uncertainty 
η σ = 0.157 
Permanent Income Profile  Polynomial profile 
b 
Income Uncertainty  θ  = 1 
ξ σ  = 0.130  
ε σ  = 0.121 
c 
Mortality  US Females 
d  
Equity / permanent wage 
error covariance 
ηξ σ = 0.00181  
Liquidity Constraints  Directly Imposed 
Private Annuity Market  λ = 10% 
e 
 
Notes to Table 2: 
 
a No bequest motive is assumed and labor supply is assumed to be exogenous.  
b The profile was taken from Campbell et al. (1999), estimated from the PSID separately for college-
educated individuals, following Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995).  The profile is shown in Figure 2. 
c Many authors have used the PSID to obtain estimates of income variance.  The values used here are 
slightly higher than those used by Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995), Heaton and Lucas (2000), and 
Carroll (1992).  These results were derived from Campbell et al.’s analysis of the PSID.  Temporary 
standard deviations were his results for college-educated individuals, halved to allow for measurement 
error.   
d The projected mortality of the cohort of US Females born in 1980, calculated by the Berkeley mortality 
database with data from the Social Security Administration was used.   For information about the tables, go 
to http://demog.berkeley.edu/wilmoth/mortality. 
e Mitchell et al (1999) estimate adverse selection and loading costs to be around 10% of the cost of 
annuities.
 
  39    
Table 3:  Optimal DB replacement rates by age of option and initial financial wealth:   
 
  Initial cash-on-hand / Initial wages 
b 
Age 
a  2 5  8 
42  0 0  0 
43  0 0  0 
44  0 0  0 
45  0 0  0.02 
46  0 0.02  0.07 
47  0 0.04  0.10 
48  0 0.06  0.13 
49  0.01 0.09  0.15 
50  0.03 0.12  0.18 
51  0.05 0.14  0.21 
52  0.08 0.17  0.25 
53  0.10 0.21  0.28 
54  0.13 0.24  0.32 
55  0.15 0.28  0.36 
56  0.18 0.31  0.40 
57  0.21 0.35  0.45 
58  0.24 0.39  0.48 
59  0.26 0.41  0.42* 
60  0.26 0.34*  0.34* 
 
Notes to Table 3: 
 
The table shows the optimal DB replacement rate (i.e. the optimal DB pension as a proportion of final 
salary) for the model described in the text, with assumptions as listed in Table 2.  The table assumes the 
wage profile of a college-educated individual, as shown in Figure 2, with temporary and permanent earning 
shock standard deviations as shown in Table 2.  No high school and high-school educated individuals have 
quantitatively similar results and hence are not shown.  In the notation of the model, the figures listed equal 
ˆ tκ , the years of service multiplied by the optimal annual accrual rate.  Figures shown to calculated 
precision.  At earlier ages, optimal DB plan participation equals 0 for all levels of wealth below the largest 
one listed.  An * indicates a solution where the contribution to the DB pension plan equals an individual’s 
entire salary. 
 
a This is the age at which the option to join the pension plan is granted – i.e. 65-t in the notation of the 
model. 
b Cash-on-hand is all wealth not invested in the pension plan and excluding the present value of future 
wages.  Initial wages is the first wage the individual receives.  40    
Table 4:  Parameter Sensitivity. 
   
Risk aversion ( ρ )  Optimal DB replacement rate 
e 
3   0.37 
5   0.28 
7   0.14 
Annuity loading  Optimal DB replacement rate 
e 
0%   0.00 
5%   0.14 
10%   0.28 
Productivity growth 
a  Optimal DB replacement rate 
e 
0% p.a.    0.28 
1% p.a.    0.26 
2% p.a.    0.24 
Equity risk premium  Optimal DB replacement rate 
e 
2% p.a.    0.31 
4% p.a.    0.28 
6% p.a.    0.23 
Rate of time preference  Optimal DB replacement rate 
e 
2% p.a.    0.29 
4% p.a.    0.28 
6% p.a.    0.27 
Wage variability factor 
b  Optimal DB replacement rate 
e 
0.5   0.56 
1   0.28 
1.5   0.03 
DB Guarantee 
d  Optimal DB replacement rate 
e 
0% p.a.    0.28 
1% p.a.    0.38 
2% p.a.    0.77 
 
Notes to Table 4: 
 
Where an assumption is not stated, its value is as in the base case, described in Table 2.  This table uses the 
wage profile and variability estimates of college-educated students, as adjusted and described in Table 2.  
Results for high-school educated and no-high school educated individuals are quantitatively similar and 
hence are not shown.  An * indicates a solution where the DB contribution rate equals the individual’s 
entire salary. 
  
a This is an annual percentage adjustment made to the wage profile discussed in the notes to Table 2 above 
to compensate for the fact that the estimation procedure used may not have fully captured the effects of 
rising productivity due to the short sample period.  Base value is 0.
   
b This is a factor by which the temporary and permanent components of wage variability (presented in 
Table 2) are multiplied to illustrate the effect of variation in wages.  Base value is 1.0. 
c This ratio is described in the notes to Table 3. 
d This is an amount added to the risk-free rate when calculating the level proportion of wages the individual 
must contribute to the DB pension plan.  Base value is 0. 
e In the notation of the model, the figures listed equal  ˆ tκ , the years of service multiplied by the optimal 
annual accrual rate.  41    
Figure 1:  The impact of pension-induced productivity improvements on apparent pension discount rate 
 
               
 
Notes to Figure 1: 
 
Dotted line represents wages without pension.  If a pension is offered, worker productivity may improve (possibly because of the incentive effects, reduced 
turnover or sorting effects of the pension), implying an increased total wage, shown as the top solid line.  The worker will have pension contributions (calculated 
at the risk free rate) deducted from wages, leaving cash wages as shown by the bottom solid line.  To the worker, however, it will appear as though cash wages 




Time  42    








































Source:  Campbell et al. (1999).  This graph consists of polynomial smoothed age dummies from an analysis of average earnings from the PSID.    43    
 



























Income Assets Cons Equity
 
Notes to Figure 3: 
 
All parameters equal expected value throughout life.  Assumptions as assumed in Table 2, for college-educated individual.   κ = 0.  ‘Assets’ line includes direct 
equity and bond holdings.  ‘Equity’ line includes direct equity holdings.  ‘Income’ includes proceeds of private annuity in retirement.  ‘Cons’ is consumption.   44    
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A/Y = 2 A/Y = 5 A/Y = 8
 
Notes to Figure 4: 
 
Vertical axis shows optimal DB replacement rate.  In the notation of the model, this is  ˆ tκ .   Horizontal axis shows the age at which the individual is offered the 
option of joining the DB plan.  A/Y means initial financial assets expressed as a ratio to initial wage income.  At ages lower than 44, the optimal participation in 
the DB plan is 0 for all levels of wealth less than the maximum shown here.  The values are shown in Table 3.  45    


























Income Assets Cons Equity
 
Notes to Figure 5: 
 
All parameters equal expected value throughout life.  Assumptions as assumed in Table 2, for college-educated individual.   κ = 0.  ‘Assets’ line includes direct 
equity and bond holdings.  ‘Equity’ line includes direct equity holdings.  ‘Income’ includes proceeds of private annuity in retirement.  ‘Cons’ is consumption.    46    





























Income before Pens Assets Cons Equity Income after Pens
 
Notes to Figure 6: 
 
All parameters equal expected value throughout life.  Assumptions as assumed in Table 2, for college-educated individual. κ =  ˆ κ .  ‘Assets’ line includes direct 
equity and bond holdings.  ‘Equity’ line includes direct equity holdings.  ‘Income after Pens’ line shows income after pension contributions and pension annuity 
is paid out.  ‘Income before pens’ includes proceeds of private annuity in retirement, but not the pension annuity.    ‘Cons’ is consumption. 